Given a recursive ordinal Λ, the transfinite provability logic GLPΛ has for each ξ < Λ a modality [ξ] with the intention of representing a sequence of provability predicates of increasing strength. One possibility is to read [ξ]φ as φ is provable in T using an ω-rule of depth ξ, where T is a secondorder theory extending ACA0.
Introduction
One compelling and particularly successful interpretation of modal logic is to think of φ as the formula φ is provable, where provability is understood within a formal theory T capable of coding syntax. This was suggested by Gödel; indeed, if we use ♦φ as a shorthand for ¬ ¬φ, the Second Incompleteness Theorem could be written as ♦⊤ → ♦ ⊥. It took some time, however, for a complete set of axioms to be assembled, namely until Löb showed ( φ → φ) → φ to be valid. It took longer still for the resulting calculus to be proven complete by Solovay [12] . The resulting modal logic is called GL (for Gödel-Löb).
Later, Japaridze [10] enriched the language of GL by adding a sequence of provability modalities [n], for n < ω. The modality [0] is now used as before to state that φ is derivable within some fixed formal theory T , while higher modalities represent provability in stronger and stronger theories. There are many arithmetic interpretations for Japaridze's logic, and one of them also stems from an idea of Gödel, who introduced the notion of a theory T being ω-consistent: T is ω-consistent whenever for any formula φ, if T ⊢ φ(n) for all n ∈ N, then T ∃x¬φ(x). Dually to this notion one can define a notion of We will normally be interested in the case where ≺ is a well-order, in which case it is known that ξ ⊤ is consistent with GLP ≺ for all ξ (see [8] ). In case ≺ is a recursive well-order of order-type Λ we shall often write GLP Λ instead of GLP ≺ making the necessary definitional changes for finite order types Λ. We shall also work with Kripke semantics. A Kripke frame is a structure F = W, R i i<I , where W is a set and R i i<I a family of binary relations on W . A valuation on F is a function · : L [·] → P(W ) such that
A Kripke model is a Kripke frame equipped with a valuation · . Note that propositional variables may be assigned arbitrary subsets of W . Clearly, a valuation is uniquely determined once we have fixed its values for the propositional variables. As usual, φ is satisfied on F, · if φ = ∅, and valid on F, · if φ = W . It is well-known that polymodal GL is sound for F whenever R
−1 i
is wellfounded and transitive, in which case we write R −1 i as < i . However, constructing models of GLP Λ is substantially more difficult than constructing models of GL, since the full logic GLP Λ is not sound and complete for any class of Kripke frames. In Section 7 we will circumvent this problem by working in Beklemishev's J, a slightly weaker logic that is complete for a manageable class of Kripke frames.
Second-order arithmetic
Aside from the modal language L [·] , we will work mainly in the language L 2 ∀ of second-order arithmetic.
We fix some primitive recursive Gödel numbering mapping a formula ψ ∈ L 2 ∀ to its corresponding Gödel number ψ , and similarly for terms and sequents of formulas (used to represent derivations). Moreover, we fix some set of numerals which are terms so that each natural number n is denoted by exactly one numeral written as n. Since we will be working mainly inside theories of arithmetic, we will often identify ψ with ψ or even with ψ for that matter. Our results are not very sensitive to the specific choice of primitive symbols; however, to simplify notation, we will assume we have the following terms available:
1. A term x, y which returns a code of the ordered pair formed by x and y.
2.
A term x[y/z] which, when x codes a formula φ, y a variable v and z a term t, returns the code of the result of subsituting t for v in φ. Otherwise, its value is unspecified, for example it could be the default ⊥ . We shall often just write φ(t) for this term if the context allows us to.
3. A term x → y which, when x, y are codes for φ, ψ, returns a code of φ → ψ, and similarly for other Boolean operators or quantifiers. The context should always clarify if we use the symbol → as a term or as a logical connective.
4.
A term x mapping a natural number to the code of its numeral.
5. For every formula φ, a term φ(ẋ) which, given a natural number n, returns the code of the outcome of φ[x/n], i.e., the code of φ(n).
We will also use this notation in the metalanguage. The only purpose of assuming these terms exist is to shorten complex formulas, as the graphs of all these functions are definable by low level arithmetic formulas over most standard arithmetic languages.
As is customary, we use ∆ 0 0 to denote the set of all formulas (possibly with set parameters) where all quantifiers are "bounded", that is, of the form ∀x < y φ or ∃x < y φ. We simultaneously define Σ It is well-known that every second-order formula is equivalent to another in one of the above forms. If Γ is a set of formulas, we denote byΓ the subset of Γ where no set variables appear free.
We will say a theory T is representable if there is a∆ 0 0 formula Proof T (x, y) which holds if and only if x codes a derivation in T of a formula coded by y; in general we assume all theories to be representable. We may also assume without loss of generality that any derivation d is a derivation of a unique formula φ, for example by representing d as a finite sequence of formulas whose last element is φ. Also, we assume that every formula that is derivable has arbitrarily large derivations; this is generally true of standard proof systems, for example one may add many copies of an unused axiom or many redundant cuts. Whenever it does not lead to confusion we will work directly with codes rather than formulas; if φ is a natural number (supposedly coding a formula) we use T φ as a shorthand for ∃y Proof T (y, φ).
It is important in this paper to keep track of the second-order principles that are used; below we describe the most important ones. We use < to denote the standard ordering on the naturals and Γ denotes some set of formulas:
where φ ∈ Γ; Ind ∀x( ∀ y<x y ∈ X → x ∈ X) → ∀x x∈X.
We assume all theories extend two-sorted first-order logic, so that they include Modus Ponens, Generalization, etc., as well as Robinson's Arithmetic, i.e. Peano Arithmetic without induction.
Another principle that will be relevant to us is transfinite recursion, but this is a bit more elaborate to describe. For simplicity let us assume that L 2 ∀ contains only monadic set-variables; binary relations and functions can be represented by coding pairs of numbers. It will be convenient to establish a few conventions for working with binary relations in second-order arithmetic. First, let us write R is a binary relation and f is a function:
Here, ∃! is the standard abbreviation for there exists a unique.
Also for simplicity, we may write n R m if R represents a relation and n, m ∈ R as well as n R m for ¬( n, m ∈ R), or n = f (m) if m, n ∈ f and f is meant to be interpreted as a function. Further, it is possible to work with a second-order equality symbol, but it suffices to define X ≡ Y by ∀x(x ∈ X ↔ y ∈ Y ).
It will also be important to represent ordinals in second-order arithmetic. For this we will reserve a set-variable ≺. Here, we will need to express the relation ≺ is a linear order and the relation ≺ is well-ordered, as follows:
We will use Greek letters for natural numbers when viewed as ordered under ≺. When it is clear from context we may use natural numbers to represent finite ordinals, so that, for example, 0 is the least element under ≺, independently of whether it truly corresponds to the natural number zero.
We shall often want that the elementary properties of ≺ be provable, for example,
This can be guaranteed if we work with recursive well-orders, in which case we assume T contains an axiom ∀ x, y (x ≺ y ↔ σ(x, y)) for someΣ
Transfinite recursion is the principle that sets may be defined by iterating a formula along a well-order. To formalize this, let us consider a set X whose elements are of the form ξ, x . Write X ξ for {x | ξ, x ∈ X} and X ≺ξ for {x | ∃ ζ≺ξ ζ, x ∈ X}. Then, given a set of formulas Γ we define
With this, we may define the following systems of arithmetic:
ω . We list these from weakest to strongest, but even ATR 0 is fairly weak in the realm of second-order arithmetic. For convenience we will work mainly in ACA 0 , but later discuss how our techniques could be pushed down even to below RCA 0 at the cost of slightly stronger transfinite induction.
The system ATR 0 is relevant because we will define iterated provability by recursion over the well-order ≺. However, as we shall see, we require much less than the full power of arithmetic transfinite recursion.
In various proofs we wish to reason by transfinite induction. By TI(≺, φ) we denote the transfinite induction axiom for φ along the ordering ≺:
We will write φ-CA instead of {φ}-CA, i.e., the instance of the comprehension axiom stating that {x | φ(x)} is a set. The following lemma tells us that we have access to transfinite induction for formulas of the right complexity: Lemma 3.1. In any second order arithmetic theory containing predicate logic we can prove wo(≺) ∧ ¬φ-CA → TI(≺, φ).
Proof. Reason in T and assume wo(≺) ∧ ¬φ-CA. We prove TI(≺, φ) by contraposition. Thus, suppose that ∃λ¬φ(γ). As {ξ | ¬φ(ξ)} is a set, we can apply wo(≺) to obtain the minimal such λ. Clearly for this minimal λ we do not have ∀ ζ≺λ φ(ζ) → φ(λ).
Nested ω-rules
In this section we shall formalize the notion of iterated ω-rules inside secondorder arithmetic. In Boolos ([6] ) it is noted that multiple parallel applications of the ω-rule do not add extra strength. For example, the rule that allows us to conclude σ from ∀n ⊢ ψ(n) ∀m ⊢ ∀xψ(x) → φ(m) ⊢ ∀x φ(x) → σ can actually be derived by a single application of the ω rule. However, when we admit slightly less uniformity by allowing ψ to depend on m in this rule, and adding the premises ∀n ⊢ ψ m (n) we get our notion of 2-provability. More generally, we may iterate this process to generate a hierarchy or stronger and stronger notions of ξ-provability for a recursive ordinal ξ. It is the nesting depth that gives extra strength and not the number of applications.
We will use [λ]
≺ T φ to denote our representation of The formula φ is provable in T using one application of an ω-rule of depth λ (according to ≺). The desired recursion for such a sequence of provability predicates is given by the following equivalence.
As a first step in such a formalization, we will use a set X as an 'iterated provability class' IPC for short. Its elements are codes of pairs λ, φ , with λ a code for an ordinal and φ a code for a formula; we use [λ] X φ as a shorthand for λ, φ ∈ X and λ X φ for λ, ¬φ ∈ X. Clearly, any IPC will depend on a parameter ≺ whose intended interpretation is a well-ordering on the naturals. We then define a formula IPC Intuitively, we understand IPC ≺ T (X) as stating "X is an iterated provability predicate" and in the remainder of this text we will use both 'class' or 'predicate' to refer to IPCs. Let us enter in a bit more detail:
1 There are other reasonable ways of defining this recursion. In Appendix A, we shall discuss some possible alternatives.
Note that the formulas [λ] X φ and λ X φ are independent of T and of ≺ and are merely of complexity ∆ 0 0 . Note also that for r.e. theories T we have that Rule
We can write the definition of IPC ≺ T (X) more succinctly as
From the definition of our provability predicates we easily obtain monotonicity:
Lemma 4.2. Given theories U, T where U extends ACA 0 and T is representable, we have that
Proof. We reason within U . Suppose ≺ T , is a very weak one as it has a universal quantification over all provability predicates X and it may be the case that there are no such predicates. Dually, the notion of consistency ξ ≺ T is very strong as it in particular asserts the existence of a provability predicate. In particular, we always provably have
However, we can in general not prove [0]
Nevertheless, the two notions of provability coincide under the assumption that a provability predicate exists:
Lemma 4.4. Given a representable theory T and a theory U that extends ACA 0 we have
The proof is straightforward and is left to the reader.
In the field of formalized provability one often uses formalized Σ 
Of course, it makes really no sense to speak of provable Σ 0 1 completeness where we allow free set variables. In particular we cannot apply it to our notion [0] X φ, which is why Lemma 4.4 will often be useful.
A useful fact is that [λ]
≺ T φ is well-defined in the following sense: Lemma 4.6. Given theories U, T where U extens ACA 0 and T is representable, we have that U proves
Proof. This follows by a simple induction over ≺.
Moreover, under the assumption of wo(≺) we can also show a useful monotonicity property of our provability predicates.
Lemma 4.7. Let U be some theory extending ACA 0 and let T and
Introspective theories
For a theory T to be able to reason about non-trivial facts of iterated provability at all, it is necessary for it to at least "believe" that such a notion exists. For strong theories this is not an issue, but there is no reason to assume that ACA 0 or any weaker theory is capable of proving that we have provability predicates. Hence we shall pay attention to those theories that do have them, and we shall call them introspective theories.
Definition 5.1 (Introspective theory). An arithmetic theory T is ≺-introspective if T ⊢ ∃XIPC
≺ T (X). We defined provability operators by transfinite recursion, and as such it should be no surprise that ATR 0 is introspective:
Given an elementarily presented theory T ,
In particular, ATR 0 is introspective.
However, we wish to work over much weaker theories than ATR 0 , which may not be introspective. Our strategy will be to consider some sort of an "introspective closure", but do not wish for it to become much stronger than the original theory. Fortunately, this is not too difficult to achieve. Below, we use the term "Gödelian" somewhat informally as being susceptible to Gödel's second incompleteness theorem; for example, it could be taken to mean sound, representable and extending RCA 0 .
Lemma 5.4. T is equiconsistent with T , provided T is Gödelian and containŝ
Clearly the consistency of T implies the consistency of T . For the other direction we use that if T is Gödelian, then T is equiconsistent with
Indeed, reasoning within T , if T were inconsistent, then T φ for every formula φ. It follows that if X is an iterated provability operator, then [λ] X φ for all λ and φ; hence the trivial set consisting of all pairs λ, φ is an iterated provability operator, and by∆ 0 0 comprehension, it forms a set. There is still a danger of sliding down a slippery-slope, where T is itself not introspective, thus needing to generate a sequence of theories that is each "introspective over the previous". Fortunately, this is not the case. In order to show this we need a technical lemma reminiscent of the Deduction Theorem.
Definition 5.5. Let X be an iterated provability operator, so that IPC ≺ T (X) holds. We define the set X given θ -which we denote by {X|θ}-as
The technical lemma that we shall now prove tells us in particular that introspection is preserved under taking finite extensions.
Lemma 5.6. Let U be some theory containing ∆ 0 0 comprehension, and let T be representable. Then
But this follows easily from the tautology
and the definition of {Y |θ}.
As a direct consequence of this lemma we see that the introspective closure of a theory is indeed itself introspective. We conclude that working with introspective theories is not too restrictive:
Corollary 5.8. Every Gödelian theory T is equiconsistent to an introspective theory T .
Note that in general we may not expect for U to prove ∃XIPC ≺ T +θ (X) → ∃XIPC ≺ T (X) since for θ = T ⊥ the antecedent always holds (recall the proof of Lemma 5.4).
A problem that T has is that it introduces an existential second-order formula, which may make it hard later to control the complexity of the resulting theory. Because of this, it is sometimes more convenient to work with explicitly introspective theories: Definition 5.9. Given a formal theory T , we define T π over the language L The proof proceeds as before and we omit it. Parameter-free comprehension is very convenient in that it does not "blow up", as it cannot be iterated; for example, Π 0 1 comprehension with set parameters is equivalent to full arithmetic comprehension, butΠ 0 1 comprehension is not. Now that we have shown that introspective theories are not such a bad thing to work with, we will employ them freely in the next sections. Introspective theories are capable of reasoning about their own iterated provability; for example, we may prove the desired recursion as stated in (1).
Lemma 5.11. Let T be a theory that extends ACA 0 . Then, we have that
Proof. In the first item, we reason in T and need to prove [λ] ≺ T φ under the assumption of the antecedent. To this end, we fix some X with IPC ≺ T (X) and show [λ] X φ. However, this follows directly from the definition of X being a provability predicate since we can replace ∀n [ξ]
For the remaining implication in the second item we reason as follows. In case λ = 0 we get the implication by Lemma 4.4. In case λ > 0, from the definition we see that for any provability predicate X we have
From this we obtain
from which the claim directly follows.
Soundness
In this section we shall see that indeed GLP ≺ is sound for its arithmetic interpretation. In Lemma 4.2 we have already seen the soundness of the monotonicity
For the remaining axioms we will transfinite induction over ≺ so we define, given a second-order theory T , a new theory T ≺ as T ≺ := T + wo(≺).
We will assume that T contains ACA 0 , although in Appendix B we shall discuss this choice. Since introspection is closed under taking finite extensions both T ≺ and T ≺ are introspective (though not necessarily equivalent); for all our arguments below it is irrelevant which one we use. Let us first check the soundness of the basic distribution axiom.
Lemma 6.1. Given theories U, T where U extends ACA 0 and T is representable, then
Proof. We reason within U ≺ . Let X be a provability predicate. We shall prove by induction on λ that
Note that by Lemma 3.1 we only need Σ 0 1 comprehension (with set parameters) to have access to this transfinite induction.
So, we assume that
and let ψ 1 , ψ 2 be such that
Let ξ = max{ξ 1 , ξ 2 }. By induction on ξ ≺ λ and several uses of Modus Ponens inside [ξ] X we obtain for each n that [ξ] X (ψ 1 (n) ∧ ψ 2 (n)). But given that X is an IPC, this shows in combination with (4) that [λ] X φ 2 and we have shown (3) .
To conclude the proof, we assume that [λ]
With our distribution axiom at hand we can now obtain a formalized Deduction Theorem.
Lemma 6.2. Let U be a theory extending ACA 0 and let T be representable. We have that So far we have shown that some of the axioms of GLP ≺ are sound for our omega-rule interpretation; Löb's axiom and the "provable consistency" axiom remain to be checked. For the former, the following lemma will be quite useful. Lemma 6.3. Extend GL with a new operator and the following axioms for all formulas φ, and ψ:
and call the resulting system GL . Then for all φ,
Proof. It is well-known that GL is equivalent to K4 plus the Löb Rule:
Thus it suffices to check that this rule holds for . But indeed, assume that GL ⊢ φ → φ. Then, using φ → φ we obtain φ → φ, and by Löb's rule (for ) we see that GL ⊢ φ, as desired.
Thus to show that [λ]
≺ T is Löbian for all λ, we need only show the following: Lemma 6.4. Given a recursive order ≺, theories U, T where U extends ACA 0 and T is representable, we have that
We assume IPC ≺ T (X) and will show by induction on By the induction hypothesis on ξ ≺ λ, for every number n we can see that
Thus we obtain by one application of the ω-rule that
Meanwhile, we have that [0] X T (∀xψ(x) →φ) from which it follows by monotonicity that
[λ] X T (∀xψ(x) →φ).
Since ≺ is recursive we also have that
Putting (5), (6) and (7) together and bringing the existential quantifiers under the box we conclude that
By an application under the box of Lemma 5.11.1 (note that no need of introspection is required) we obtain [λ] X [λ]
≺ Tφ as was to be proven. In the proof of the remaining GLP ≺ axiom we will need for the first and only time the assumption that T is introspective.
Lemma 6.5. If U is any theory extending ACA 0 , ≺ is recursive and T is representable and ≺-introspective, then
Proof. We reason in U ≺ and assume that ξ ≺ λ. Let us first see that it is sufficient to show that for an arbitrary provability predicate X we have ξ X φ →
In view of the above, we will prove
and by Lemma 4.4
from which we conclude that [1] X 0 ≺ Tφ . So assume that λ ≻ 1. If we have that ξ X φ then for every formula ψ either 1. for all η ≺ ξ there is n < ω such that η X ¬ψ(n), or 2. ♦ T (∀xψ(x) ∧ φ) holds.
In the first case, by the induction hypothesis for ξ ≺ λ we can see that ∃n [ξ] X η ≺ T ¬ψ(n); in the second, we have that [ξ] X ♦ T (∀xψ(x) ∧ φ). Combining these, we obtain
Since ≺ is recursive, we know that η ξ → [ξ] Xη ξ . We thus see that, for all pairs η, ψ ,
By one application of the ω-rule to all pairs η, ψ (represented as natural numbers) we obtain
and by definition (Lemma 5.11.1 applied under the box) we get [λ] X ξ ≺ Tφ . We have essentially proven that GLP ≺ is sound for its omega-rule interpretation, but we need the following definition in order to make this claim precise. Now that we have proven that GLP ≺ is sound, our main objective will be to prove the converse of Theorem 6.7 which is hyper-arithmetical completeness of GLP ≺ . For this, let us first review the modal logic J.
The logic J
It is well-known that GLP Λ has no non-trivial Kripke frames for Λ > 1. In order to remedy for this situation, we pass to a weaker logic, Beklemishev's J. The logic J is as GLP ω where we replace the monotonicity axiom of GLP ω by the two axioms
The logic J is proven in [3] to be sound and complete for the class of finite Kripke models W, > n n<N , · such that 1. the relations < n are transitive and well-founded, 2. if n < m and w < m v then < n (w) = < n (v) (where < n (w) = {u : u < n w}) and, 3. if n < m then w < m v < n u implies that w < n u.
It will also be convenient to define some auxiliary relations. Say:
• w ≪ n v if for some m ≥ n, w < m v and,
• w ≪ n v if w ≪ n v or there is u ∈ W such that w ≪ n u and v ≪ n+1 u.
By the above frame conditions it is easy to see that ≪ n is transitive and wellfounded. We will also use ≪ n and ≪ n to denote the respective reflexive closures. Let ≈ n denote the symmetric, reflexive, transitive closure of ≪ n and let [w] n denote the equivalence class of w under
, it follows that w < n v. Note that the property of being stratified in particular entails the modally inexpressible frame condition that w < n v and w < m u implies u < n v whenever m > n. With this we may state the following completeness result also from [3] : Lemma 7.1. Any J-consistent formula can be satisfied on a finite, stratified J-frame.
Thus if we can reduce GLP ω to J, we will be able to work with finite wellbehaved Kripke models. For this, given a formula φ whose maximal modality is N , define
The following is also proven in [3] :
We shall use these results in the next section to prove arithmetical completeness by "piggybacking" from the completeness of J for finite frames.
Completeness
In this section we want to prove that GLP ≺ is complete for its ω-rule interpretation. This means that, given a consistent formula φ, there is an arithmetic interpretation f such that ¬f ≺ T (φ) is not derivable in T (we will make this claim precise in Theorem 8.2).
There are many proofs of completeness of GL and GLP ω , and it is possible to go back to an existing proof and adjust it to prove completeness in our setting. Because of this, we should say a few words about our choice of including a full proof in this paper. There are essentially two reasons.
The first is that, while our result follows to a certain degree from known proofs, it does not follow from known results; even then, there would be several technical issues in adjusting known arguments to our setting, as they make assumptions that are not available to us.
The second is that the argument we propose carries some simplifications over previous proofs that could also be applied to standard interpretations of GLP ω , thus contributing to an ongoing effort to find simpler arguments for this celebrated result.
To be more precise, there are at least six proofs in the literature:
1. Solovay originally constructed a function h with domain ω of a self-referential nature and used statements about h to prove the completeness theorem for the unimodal GLP 1 [12] . The proof used the recursion theorem.
2. De Jongh, Jumelet and Montagna introduced a modification using the fixpoint theorem instead of the recursion theorem [7] , where the function h is simulated via finite sequences that represent computations [7] . This approach is presented in greater detail in [6] .
3. A more elementary construction using the simultaneous fixpoint theorem is also given in [7] .
4. Japaridze proved completeness for GLP ω with essentially the ω-rule interpretation we are presenting here [10] .
5. Ignatiev generalized this result to a large family of "strong provability predicates" [9] .
6. Beklemishev gave a simplified argument using the logic J, which is very well-behaved. However, this proof still considers a family of N Solovay functions h n with domain ω, where N is the number of modal operators appearing in our "target formula" φ.
Despite these strong provability predicates being quite general, they do not apply to our interpretation, as for example it is assumed that they are of increasing logical complexity whereas our iterated provability operators are all given by a single Π 1 1 formula. The argument we present here, aside from being the fist that considers aribtrary recursive well-orders, combines ideas from [7] and [4] by considering finite paths over a polymodal J-frame. We do so by introducing an additional trick, which is to work with all modalities simultaneously, where our path makes a λ n -step whenever appropriate. Readers familiar with known proofs might find it surprising that this is not problematic, but indeed it isn't and otherwise the argument proceeds as in other settings. As always, we will mimic a Kripke structure using arithmetic formulas and define our arithmetic interpretation based on them.
Since GLP ≺ is Kripke incomplete, we will resort to J-models instead. These models are related to GLP ω as described in the previous section. The step from GLP ≺ to GLP ω is provided by the following easy lemma which is also given in [5] . With this easy lemma at hand we may give an outline of the proof of our completess theorem, which reads as follows. The next ingredient is to assign to each w ∈ W an arithmetic sentence σ w so that the formulas σ are a "snapshot" of W. We will make this precise in Definition 8.4, but let us outline the essential properties that we need from σ.
First, we need for the arithmetic interpretation f that sends a propositional variable p to f (p) := w∈ p σ w to have the property that
for each w ∈ W ′ and each subformula ψ of φ. In particular we have T ⊢ σ w * → ¬f ≺ T (φ) from which we obtain
Our desired result will follow if the formulas σ satisfy two more properties: the second is that
and the third, that N |= σ 0 . By the assumption that T is sound we conclude that
is not provable in T which is what was to be shown.
Before we proceed to give the details needed to complete the proof we state as an easy consequence of our arithmetic completeness theorem the following lemma which was also proven by purely modal means in [5] .
Corollary 8.3. Given a recursive well-order ≺ and an
Proof. One direction is Lemma 8.1. For the other direction, suppose GLP ω φ. By the proof of Theorem 8.2 we find an arithmetical interpretation f so that
. By the soundness theorem (Thm. 6.7) we conclude that GLP ≺ φ.
Before entering into further detail, we first say what it means that a collection of sentences σ = {σ 0 , . . . , σ k } is a snapshot of a Kripke structure with nodes {0, . . . , k} inside a theory. Most importantly, this means that each world w will be associated with an arithmetic sentence σ w so that this sentence carries all the important information in terms of accessible worlds.
Definition 8.4. Given a sequence
a finite J-model W = W, < n n<N , · with root 0, and a formal theory T , a family of formulas {σ w : w ∈ W } is a λ-snapshot of W in T if
T σ v for all n < N and v < n w, 3. for all n < N and for each world w = 0,
If W, σ, λ, T are as above we will write σ :
-formula with modalities amongst λ such that W |= M + (φ), and f (p) := w∈ p σ w . Then, for all 0 = w ∈ W and every subformula ψ of φ,
Proof. By an easy induction on the complexity of ψ.
In the remainder of this section, we shall mainly see how to produce snapshots of a given Kripke model W in a theory T . We define the corresponding sentences σ w for w ∈ W in a standard way as limit statements of certain computable Solovay functions.
One important notion in all known Solovay-style proofs, including our own, is the notion of a "code for a ξ-derivation of φ." Definition 8.6. Let X be a set of natural numbers. A code of a 0-proof of φ over X is any natural number m satisfying Proof T (m, φ). We assume that every derivation proves a unique formula in our coding, and that this fact is derivable; we also assume that every derivable formula has arbitrarily large derivations 2 . For ξ ≻ 0, a triple ζ, n, m codes a ξ-derivation of φ over X if ξ ≻ ζ and 1. n = ψ for some ψ such that, given k < ω, [ζ] X ψ(k) and 2. m is a code of a 0-proof of ∀xψ → φ.
Let Proof X (x, ξ, φ) be a formula stating that x = ζ, ψ, d codes a ξ-derivation of φ over X.
Of course in Proof X the intention is for X to be an iterated provability operator, and we may define
Note that formula Proof ≺ T is of rather high complexity (Π 1 1 ) which is moreover independent of ξ. However, the behavior of Proof ≺ T (x, ξ, φ) is simple in the eyes of λ provability whenever λ ξ, as is expressed in the next lemma.
Lemma 8.7. Let T be a theory extending ACA 0 . For ξ λ we have
We prove the first item. We reason in T ≺ and assume Proof
All conjuncts other than ∀n[µ]
≺ T ψ(n) are of complexity∆ 0 1 so they -as their negations-all are 0-provable whence certainly λ-provable. By Lemma 6.4 we obtain ∀n[µ]
, and since µ ≺ λ we use one application of the ω-rule to see that
Since the [λ]
≺ T predicate is closed under conjunction we have the entire conjunction (9) under the scope of the [λ] ≺ T predicate which was to be shown. The second item goes analogously now using Lemma 6.5 instead of 6.4.
Solovay sequences
Let us define a Solovay sequence or path; these sequences are given by a recursion based on provability operators which depends on a parameter φ. Later we will choose an appropriate value of φ via a fixpoint construction. We shall use the following notation: Seq(x) is a∆ 0 0 formula stating that x codes a sequence, last(x) is a term that picks out the last element of x, x ⊑ y is a∆ 0 0 formula that states that x is an initial segment of y, |x| gives the length of x and x y a term which picks the y-coordinate of x. As in previous sections, it is not necessary to have these terms available in our language, as we can define their graphs and replace them by pseudo-terms, but we shall write them as such for simplicity of exposition.
We will also define a (pseudo) term Lim which gives a formula stating that the paths satsifying φ "converge" to w:
We shall use these formulas to define our recursive paths.
Definition 8.9. Let W = W, < n n<N , · be a Kripke frame and let λ = λ n n<N a finite sequence. We define a formula s :
We then set s :
We should remark that s, X, φ are variables and λ, W are external parameters so that we are in fact defining a family of formulas. With this we can say what it means to be a Solovay path. 
Further, we say w is a Solovay value at i if
holds, and w is a limit Solovay value if it satisfies
The following shows that Solovay values in fact define a function.
Lemma 8.11. If U extends ACA 0 , T is any representable theory, W is a Jframe and λ a ≺-increasing sequence, it is derivable in U that
Proof.
1 Clearly it suffices to prove that
for then if s, s ′ are any two paths and, say, |s| ≤ |s ′ |, it follows that s i = s ′ i for all i < |s| and thus s ⊑ s ′ . Moreover, this formula is arithmetic and hence we may proceed by induction on i.
The base case is trivial since s 0 = s ′ 0 = 0. For the inductive step, we assume w = s i = s ′ i . Then, we must have that either Proof X (i, λ n , ¬Lim, φ,v)) holds for some v, n, or it does not. If it does, then the value of v is uniquely determined (as i may be the code of a derivation of only one formula) and thus
Once again the claim follows by introducing universal quantifiers over X and φ.
Lemma 8.12. Let W be a finite J-frame and λ a ≺-increasing sequence. Suppose further that U extends ACA 0 , ≺ is recursive and T is representable and ≺-introspective, w ∈ W and n ≤ N . Then,
Further,
Proof. Reasoning within U , we will prove both claims simultaneously. To be precise, we show by induction on k that 
Meanwhile, for v = s k , by our induction hypothesis
but x k ≈ n+1 v < m w provably implies that x k < m w by the J-frame conditions and thus
The claim follows by quantifying over all X.
Case 2. Suppose that for no m ≤ n do we have that s k+1 < m s k ; then as in Case 1 we have that w < m x k if and only if w < m s k and by Lemma 8.7.2 we have for each such w and m that
Thus in view of Lemma 8.11.4 and the previous case we must have that
which by definition implies that x k+1 ≈ n+1 s k+1 . Formalizing this reasoning within T , it follows that
and once again we conclude the original claim by quantifying over X.
From here on, it remains to show that the formulasw ≃ Lim{T λ ≺ W} give a snapshot of our Kripke model. Lemma 8.13. If U extends ACA 0 , ≺ is recursive and T is representable and ≺-introspective, m < n < N and v < m w then
Proof. Towards a contradiction, suppose that Lemma 8.14. If U, T extend ACA 0 , ≺ is recursive and T is representable and ≺-introspective, w = 0 and n ≤ N then
Let s be a Solovay path with with w = Last(s). Let k * < |s| be the greatest value such that s k * < n s k * −1 if there is such a value; otherwise set k * = 0.
By Lemma 8.12,
Moreover, by Lemma 8.13 we have that λ m
W} so that by Lemma 6.5 we also have
from which it follows using Lemma 8.11.4 that
Putting (10) and (11) together, along with the fact that s k * ≫ n+1 w we see that
It remains to disprove the case that Last(x) = w. For this, choose the least value of k such that s k+1 = w; note that this value is well-defined since s 0 = 0. It then follows that Proof Then,
Proof. We must check each of the conditions of Definition 8.4. 
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The second condition is Lemma 8.13 and the third, Lemma 8.14. We may finally prove our main completeness result.
Proof of Theorem 8.2.
We have already seen that the logic is sound.
For the other, if φ is consistent over GLP ≺ , then by Lemma 7.2, M + (φ) ∧ φ is consistent over J and thus by Lemma 7.1, M + (φ) ∧φ can be satisfied on a world w * of some stratified J-model W ′ . Define W by adding 0 as a root to W ′ and let λ be the modalities appearing in φ. By Lemma 8.15,
so that by Lemma 8.5.1,
Hence, by lemma 8.
T φ for n ∈ ω;
T φ for α ω. Proof. The proofs proceed by induction on n and α, respectively, and we omit them.
As can be seen, there is a fair amount of freedom in defining transfinite iterations of the ω-rule. We chose the current paper's presentation both for the sake of simplicity and because a more refined hierarchy is in general terms more convenient; after all, it is easy to remove intermediate operators later if they are not needed. We also suspect it will be the appropriate notion useful later for a Π 0 1 -ordinal analysis of second-order arithmetics, a goal which now seems well within our reach.
B An afterword on the choice of our base theory
In this paper we have shown sound and completeness of the logic GLP ≺ for the interpretation where each [ξ] modality is interpreted as "provable in ACA 0 using at most ξ nested applications of the omega-rule". The main applications we have in mind with this result is to provide Π 0 1 ordinal analyses of theories much stronger than PA in the style of Beklemishev ([1]). For the mere soundness of the logic however, there were quite some strong principles needed: the existence of an iterated provability class, plus a certain amount of transfinite induction. We shall discuss here how these principles fit into the intended application of ordinal analyses.
A consistency proof of U in Elementary Arithmetic (EA) plus TI(Π 0 1 , ≺) (using a natural ordinal notation system for large enough ordinals) is closely related to the Π 0 1 ordinal analysis of U and we shall focus our discussion on such a consistency proof. Such a consistency proof can be seen as a partial realization of Hilbert's program in the sense that over finitsitic mathematics one can prove the consistency of a strong theory with just one additional nonfinitist ingredient. As such one could say that U is safeguarded by this method. If one accepts this method of safeguarding it makes philosophically speaking sense that one may use U itself as new base theory to safeguard even stronger theories by the same method. It is in this perspective that having ACA 0 as our base theory is not a bad thing since ACA 0 has already been safeguarded over EA using some amount of transfinite induction. However, for technical reasons it might be desirable to dispense with such an intermediate step.
In [11] it is noted that soundness of GLP ≺ suffices to perform a consistency proof and completeness is actually not needed. But also in the soundness proof presented in this paper we needed transfinite induction as well as resorting to the introspective closure of a theory. However, as we have seen in Corollary 5.8, for the sake of consistency-strength it is irrelevant to consider either a theory or its introspective closure as both theories are provably equiconsistent. Thus, to conclude, let us consider the amount of transfinite induction needed in our soundness proof of GLP ≺ .
First of all, let us note that our soundness proof of GLP ≺ uses at most TI(Π 0 1 , ≺). In a sense, this is not bad at all, because it is exactly this ingredient (in parameter free form) that is added EA to perform a consistency proof of our target theory. So, by adding this amount of transfinite induction (with parameters) to EA, we get access to exactly the soundness of GLP ≺ needed to perform this consistency proof, were it not for the case that our base theory was taken to be ACA 0 , not EA. This choice of ACA 0 has been mainly to simplify our exposition and the needed amount of arithmetic can be pushed down a lot further.
We observed that to prove TI(Π However, close inspection of the proofs in our paper shows that the only free set-parameters needed are occurrences of iterated provability classes. Thus if we enrich our language with a constant π with an axiom stating that π is an iterated provability class (see Lemma 5.10), we can do with parameter free comprehension since then TI(Π 0 1 , ≺) suffices. However, we can do better still in the sense that we need less comprehension by allowing slightly stronger well-ordering assumptions as we shall see in the next lemma.
Let us fix some bijective coding of α on the naturals, and let ≺ be a primitive recursive well-order on α. Let < denote the usual ordering on the natural numbers. Using a bijective pairing function we define a new relation ξ, n ≺ ′ ζ, m := ξ ≺ ζ ∨ (ξ = ζ ∧ n < m).
Clearly, ≺ ′ provably defines a relation of order type ω · α. With this notation we can now state our lemma. 
If we assume that ∀ y≺ ′ x ϕ(y 1 , y 0 ), using (12) we get ϕ(x 1 , x 0 ) whence by TI(∆ 0 0 , ω · α) we obtain ∀x∀zϕ(z, x).
Note that ω · α is not much larger than α. In particular, if the last term in CNF of α is at least ω ω we get that ω ·α = α. Thus, for natural proof theoretical ordinals we have this equation whence we get the extra induction for free.
